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THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF CODES IN
LEGAL ETHICS
VINCENT R. JOHNSON*
I. ETHICS AT NOTRE DAME IN THE 1970s
I studied legal ethics at Notre Dame under Tom Shaffer,
having entered the law school in 1975 during the first year of
David Link's twenty-four-year deanship. Shaffer's classes rou-
tinely presented moments of exquisite dilemma. We spent hours
pondering ethical problems, discussing and debating the diffi-
cult choices that lawyers face.
What should a lawyer do if a client commits perjury on the
witness stand, or wants to disinherit a child, or seeks assistance
with marketing a vile product, drafting a predatory lease, or
investing in a politically repressive country? Or suppose a truth-
ful statement to the press about the non-enforceability of a police
promise might cause a hostage-taker learning of the statement to
execute the captives. Or what if a lawyer knows about an unfor-
tunate loophole in the anti-discrimination laws and a client asks
for advice?
Almost a quarter of a century later, I remember the issues
and I remember the discussions. But I do not remember many
clear answers. Often there seemed to be multiple answers, and
sometimes no answers at all. Either way, solutions did not come
easily. That may have been the point. The message, as best I
understood it, was that for lawyers seeking to do the right thing
there are no simple answers to ethical questions. Resolving such
dilemmas required weighty deliberation and clear, mature judg-
ment. Ethical problem-solving, we learned, depended on the
lawyer's character and skill in making moral choices.' The deci-
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1. See Thomas L. Shaffer, On Being a Professional Elder, 62 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 624, 630 (1987) ("When character is in place, fortified by 'a few rules' that
have to do with professional craft, the professional person becomes dependa-
ble. Professional character is the connection between virtue and craft.").
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sion-making process was arduous and uncertain, but it provided
an opportunity for moral growth. At Notre Dame, being a good
person, as well as a good lawyer, was a stated goal. And one
quickly learned that that was no easy feat. As taught by Tom
Shaffer, the subject of legal ethics was tantalizing and inspiring,
and the fulfillment of one's professional obligations always
threatened to be unachievable.
I am sure that my classmates and I paid some attention to
the Code of Professional Responsibility in Shaffer's class, but the
code did not loom large. Mere adherence to codified profes-
sional standards did not hold much promise for young profes-
sionals who were urged to aspire to a goal much higher than
legal compliance. There was more to professional ethics than
interpreting the words of a statute.
Legal ethics with Tom Shaffer was moral philosophy with a
religious orientation. At Notre Dame, that was not surprising. In
the mid-1970s, morality and religion played a prominent role in
the life of the law school. Contracts class began with recitation of
the Our Father, Torts with a Hail Mary, Masses were occasionally
celebrated in the student lounge, and the final paper in Property
required students to trace rules from the Anglo-American prop-
erty system to their roots in the Judeo-Christian Tradition.
II. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY SHIFT FROM MORAL REASONING
TO LEGAL COMPLIANCE
In the hands of a master, before the right audience, legal
ethics taught as moral philosophy is a thing of great beauty and
infinite worth. In other hands, or before other audiences, it can
be a failed pedagogy, engendering resentment in students, frus-
tration in professors, or both.
One alternative is to teach legal ethics as law, rather than as
ethics.2 Indeed, at the threshold of the new millennium, nothing
could be more natural. The twentieth century in America was an
era of rampant statutorification.' The uncertain contours of the
2. It is possible to think of other terms to differentiate the ways in which
legal ethics is taught. See, e.g., Vincent Robert Johnson, Law-givers, Stoly-tellers,
and Dubin's Legal Heroes: The Emerging Dichotomy in Legal Ethics, 3 GEo. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 341, 342 (1989) (distinguishing between "law-givers," who "view legal
ethics as chiefly concerned with the identification, transmission, and enforce-
ment of uniform standards governing the conduct of lawyers," and "story-tell-
ers," who "place a higher value on persons and context than on principles and
procedures, and on the cultivation of a deeper, less mechanical sense of profes-
sionalism than detailed rules can provide").
3. See generally GUIDO CAI..ABREsi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STAT-
uTEs 1 (1982) ("The last fifty to eighty years have seen a fundamental change in
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common law, in many fields, were refined or replaced with
detailed legislation.4 A similar metamorphosis took place in the
field of attorney responsibility.5 The professional standards
which at the beginning of the 1900s took the form of aspirational
principles for good deportment6 had by the end of the century
been transformed into hard-edged rules of law.7 Forged in
heated debate, codified with precision, and routinely invoked by
disputants, the principles of legal ethics are today regularly
enforced by courts and administrative bodies as rules of law.' As
American law. In this time we have gone from a legal system dominated by the
common law, divined by courts, to one in which statutes, enacted by legisla-
tures, have become the primary source of law.").
4. See Ellen Ash Peters, Common Law Judging in a Statutory World, 43 U.
PiTr. L. REv. 995, 998 (1982) (observing that "statutes have become ubiqui-
tous"). See also Vincent R. Johnson, America's Preoccupation with Ethics in Govern-
ment, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 717, 752-53 (1999):
At the beginning of the 1900s, statutes were unusual features in Ameri-
can law. Courts made most of the law through ad hoc adjudication of
disputes. With the rise of the social welfare state during the twentieth
century, legislation became increasingly important. Today, statutes
are a bulwark in American law and address virtually every conceivable
subject, ranging from the sale of securities, to the operation of air-
craft, to liability for consumer fraud. In fact, it is difficult to think of
any dispute or problem that remains untouched by legislation ....
5. See Brenda Smith, Civility Codes: The Newest Weapons in the "Civil" War
over Proper Attorney Conduct Regulations Miss Their Mark, 24 U. DAYTON L. REv.
151, 156 (1998) ("The three model codes of conduct promulgated by the ABA
[during the twentieth century] show a movement from a mere 'aspirational
guide' in the [1908] Canons, to a combination of aspiration and discipline in
the [1969] Code, to finally, a more rigid 'ethical framework' in the [1983]
Rules.").
6. See CHARLES W. WoLRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 54 (1986) ("The
1908 Canons ... were not originally adopted in order to serve as a regulatory
blueprint for enforcement through disbarment and suspension actions.
Instead, they seem to have been a statement of professional solidarity."). The
early ethical codes for lawyers contained principles, not rules. See Thomas L.
Shaffer, The Legal Profession 's Rule Against Vouching For Clients: Advocacy and "The
Manner That Is the Man Himself, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 145,
160 (1993) ("The difference is that a rule can only be followed or broken; prin-
ciples are more flexible.").
7. The American Bar Association's promulgation of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility in 1969 was a milestone in the transformation of
principles of legal ethics into enforceable rules of law. State rules patterned on
the Code were widely enacted. See WoLRAm, supra note 6, at 56 ("In contrast to
the 1908 Canons which were only slowly adopted in some states, the 1969 Code
was an impressive and quick success .... The Code acquired the force of law
when it was adopted in ajurisdiction by state authority, typically the state's high-
est court.").
8. Court decisions involving issues arising under state attorney ethics
codes are reported bi-weekly in the Current Reports section of the ABA/BNA
LAWYER'S MANUAL OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. Disciplinary actions are fre-
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viewed from many perspectives, legal ethics is now focused heav-
ily on uniform compliance with codified rules, rather than on
individual decision-making based on moral principles. There are
many indicia of the shift. Some of the more visible developments
of the current preeminence of codified rules are the continuing
revision of codified standards,9 the widespread use of a standard-
ized professional responsibility exam as a precondition for admis-
sion to practice,1" the proliferation of rule-oriented ethics
treatises,'1 and the adoption of a new Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers.' 2
III. SHAFFER'S CRITICISM
The transformation of attorney professional ethics into a
field of legal regulation has not gone without question. Tom
Shaffer has been prominent among the critics. Addressing this
phenomenon, he has written that:
Americans in the late twentieth century evade moral dis-
cussion of what they are about .... [T] his is true of law
students in "professional responsibility" courses, as it is of
law faculties and lawyers in practice. The methods of eva-
sion are diverse but consistently banal. They include reso-
lutions that dig no deeper than rules of practice imposed
by courts-rules which virtually everyone identifies as ethi-
quently listed in bar journals or legal newspapers. See, e.g., Discipline, TEX. LAW.,
Aug. 23, 1999, at 15 (reporting disciplinary sanctions imposed on four lawyers).
9. In Texas, for example, the process of "reforming" attorney ethics rules
never ends. See Janet Elliott, Texas Supreme Court Tosses Bar Referendum, TEX.
LAw., June 28, 1999, at 4 (discussing 1998 ethics reform referendum); Bob
Schuwerk, Texas Disciplinay Rules of Professional Conduct, 62 TEX. BJ. 715 (1999)
(discussing a proposed complete revision of the Texas disciplinary rules gov-
erning conflict of interest); Texas Bar Journal Celebrating 60 Years of Service to The
Lawyers of Texas, 61 TEX. B.J. 48 (1998) (discussing referenda in 1989 and 1994
that substantially revised the ethics rules).
10. 52 American jurisdictions require applicants for admission to the bar
to take the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam. See Colorado Bar
Refresher, Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam (visited Feb. 5, 2000) <www.
cpe-cbr.com/BarReview/mpreexam.htm>.
11. The best example is GEOFFREY HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE
LAw OF LAWYERING (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1998), the organization of which
directly corresponds to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
12. See Attorneys' Standards of Conduct: Restatement On Lawyers Completed
With Final ALI Approval of All Sections, 66 U.S. L. WK. 2716 (May 26, 1998) (dis-
cussing the adoption of the Restatement, Third, of the Law Governing
Lawyers).
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cally inadequate, or labels as a superficial moral minimum,
or both....
Shaffer urges that:
[M] ost American attorneys should ignore most of what my
colleagues . . . [in the field] say about legal ethics, and
should regard official "ethics" rules for attorneys the way
they regard the motor vehicle code-as an administrative
regulation having very little to do with being righteous and
an attorney simultaneously.
14
Assessing the current state of affairs, Shaffer laments: "The claim
that a lawyer must obey his conscience (and that his conscience is
one conscience, at home or in town) fades a little more every
time the profession recodifies its rules of professional behav-
ior."" "Somewhere between [David] Hoffman's day (he died in
1854) and our own, professionalism stopped meaning that law-
yers are responsible for justice. '"6
IV. THE VIRTUE1 7 OF CODIFIED ETHics RuLEs
Shaffer's criticisms carry weight, and they are certainly plau-
sible. Codifying standards of conduct and treating ethics as a
field of legal regulation may in fact induce lawyers to abdicate
moral responsibility for their actions on behalf of clients. How-
ever, at least18 five arguments can be offered in defense of the
13. Thomas L. Shaffer, On Teaching Legal Ethics in the Law Office, 71 NoTRE
DAME L. REV. 605, 606-07 (1996). See also THOMAS L. SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE
PROFESSIONS 2 (1987) ("[S]o much of what is said in professional societies and
taught in professional schools is manifestly aimless. There must be more to it
than that.").
14. Thomas L. Shaffer, On Religious Legal Ethics, 35 CATH. LAW. 393, 397
(1994).
15. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Moral Theology of Atticus Finch, 42 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 181, 223 (1981).
16. Thomas L. Shaffer, Inaugural Howard Liechtenstein Lecture in Legal Eth-
ics: Lawyer Professionalism as Moral Argument, 26 GONZ. L. REv. 393, 402-03
(1991).
17. The word "virtue" is used here in an ordinary sense to mean "any
good quality" or "merit." WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DIcrIONARY
2042 (2d ed. 1983). In other contexts, "virtue" can be given a more specialized
meaning. See, e.g., Shaffer, supra note 16, at 396-97 (discussing "virtue words"
and the ways in which virtues are learned and perfected).
18. There are other perspectives on the advantages of ethics codes for
lawyers. See, e.g., WoLFRAM, supra note 6, at 48-49 (1986) (discussing the pur-
pose and function of lawyer codes); Richard Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate
Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REv. 639 (1981) (arguing that lawyers' ethics rules
legitimate the role of elite lawyers and are a form of market control); Deborah
Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEX.
L. REV. 689 (1981) (asserting that codes protect lawyers' interests in public
2000]
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codification of professional ethics. The first focuses on client
protection, the second on equality of client treatment, the third
on promotion of ethical discourse, the fourth on the symbolic
value of declarations of principle, and the fifth on re-examina-
tion of previous ethical choices.
A. Client Protection
It has long been noted that consumers of legal services are
often in a poor position to protect their own interests.1 9 Yet their
interests may be greatly affected by the ethical decisions that law-
yers make incidental to the practice of law. How a lawyer deals
with confidential information,2 ° treats client property,2' or han-
dles conflicting interests22 can seriously affect the fortunes of a
client and the value of the services that are rendered. The same
is true with respect to numerous other ethical issues, such as
communication of information to the client,21 acceptance or
rejection of settlement offers, 24 disclosure of falsity by a client,25
and business transactions between lawyer and client,26 to men-
tion but a few.
It is reasonable to assume that in seeking the assistance of
counsel, many clients would not anticipate the need to address
such matters. Indeed, it is often the case that persons seeking
counsel, far from being careful, methodical, rational decision-
makers, are impaired in judgment by the very plight which has
created the need for legal assistance. 27 Surely this is often the
esteem, minimize economic competition, and reinforce the perception that the
adversarial system accomplishes justice).
19. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-4 (1980) ("A
layperson who seeks legal services often is not in a position to judge whether he
will receive proper professional attention.").
20. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Rule 1.6 (1983) (dealing
with confidentiality of information).
21. See id. Rule 1.15 (dealing with safekeeping of client property).
22. See id. Rules 1.7-1.12 (dealing with conflicts of interest).
23. See id. Rule 1.4 (dealing with the duty of communication).
24. See id. Rule 1.4 cmt.1 (discussing duty to communicate settlement
offers).
25. See id. Rule 3.3 (discussing the duty of candor to a tribunal); id. at
Rule 4.1 (discussing duty of truthfulness in statements to others).
26. See id. Rule 1.8 (discussing the permissibility of business transactions
between lawyers and clients).
27. But see Vincent Robert Johnson, Solicitation of Law Firm Clients by
Departing Partners and Associates: Tort, Fiduciary, and Disciplinary Liability, 50 U.
Prr-r. L. REv. 1, 42 (1988) (suggesting that for purposes of the anti-solicitation
rule a distinction might be drawn between "'ambulance-chasing,' which often
involves the pressured confrontation of injured or distressed victims of misfor-
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case for clients who are victims of injury or accused of crime.2 8
Furthermore, even if a client is sufficiently prescient to anticipate
the range of ethical issues that should be addressed, there is rea-
son to think that in dealing with professionals many laypersons
will lack the confidence to raise those issues29 or the ability to
provide instructions as to how such matters should be handled.
Given these realities, codes of ethics serve a consumer-pro-
tection function."° They ensure that the ethical issues most likely
to arise in legal representation have been anticipated and that
standards for performance have been articulated. Of course,
whether consumers are actually protected depends upon the sub-
stance of the codified rules.31 If, however, the rules are reason-
able and appropriately enforced, clients are likely to be
safeguarded from risks against which they'need protection.
Thus, rules of ethics tend to ensure a certain minimum level of
performance in the handling of client affairs. Though perhaps
less lofty than other objectives to which the profession may
aspire, the goal of consumer protection is one that would be
regarded as worthy by many individuals, at least those whose
interests are at stake in the legal system.
B. Equality of Client Treatment
Justifying ethics rules based on equality of treatment is dif-
ferent from arguing for client-protection. Whereas the latter is
tune, [and] the regular clients of a departing attorney [who] are typically not
grief-ridden individuals awash in a sea of recent tragedy").
28. Cf Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 465 (1978) (In
upholding a prophylactic ban against lawyer in-person solicitation in a case
involving contact with an accident victim, the court noted that "the very plight
of... [an accident victim] not only makes him more vulnerable to influence
but also may make advice all the more intrusive"). See also Vincent R.Johnson,
The Ethics of Communicating with Putative Class Members, 17 REv. LITIG. 497, 513-14
(1998) (discussing the risk that insurance company adjusters seeking quick set-
tlements may overreach tort victims).
29. See THOMAS L. SHAFFR & JAMES R. ELKINS, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND
COUNSELING IN A NUTSHELL 87-88 (3d ed. 1997) (discussing client dependence).
30. See WoLFRAM, supra note 6, at 49 (stating a consumer-protection
rationale for professional codes).
31. Some ethics rules appear to be more concerned with protecting the
interests of the attorney rather than the interests of the client. The rule against
directly communicating with a represented person may fall into this category.
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1983). The prohibition
imposed by Rule 4.2 cannot be waived by the affected client, even if the client
initiates the communication. Only the client's attorney, who has a financial
interest in preventing disruption of the relationship, can consent to direct com-
munication with the client. See Johnson, supra note 28 (discussing alternative
rationales for represented-person rule).
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concerned with preventing error or abuse, the former is con-
cerned with parity.
In a given situation, more than one course may be reason-
able. This is as true in the practice of law as it is with respect to
driving a car, teaching a class, or managing a household. In the
absence of codified standards identifying which of several reason-
able solutions is the "right" answer to a recurring ethical
dilemma, there is a risk in law practice that similarly situated cli-
ents will be treated differently. The danger here is not that a
client will be harmed by a bad decision (assuming that one of
several reasonable courses has been chosen), but rather that the
client may be (or feel) wronged by reason of having been
accorded disparate treatment-treatment perhaps less advanta-
geous than another reasonable course followed in similar cir-
cumstances by a different lawyer or by the same lawyer in another
case.
The risk posed by disparate ethical decisions is more sub-
stantial than might first appear. In contemporary America, equal
treatment is highly prized, 2 as is reflected by the ubiquitous
invocations of "equal protection," "equal justice under law" and
"equal opportunity."" Indeed, in the public sector, anything
which gives one person a competitive advantage over another in
pursuing the benefits and resources that government can pro-
vide is ethically suspect. 4 "Many Americans today expect that
32. See Shaffer, supra note 16, at 398 (referring to the "popular American
value of equality").
33. A search on September 4, 1999, of the Westlaw ALLCASES database,
covering the one-year period between September 1, 1998 to August 31, 1999,
revealed that 3,091 cases contained the phrase "equal protection" and 309 cases
contained the words "equal opportunity." Interestingly, during that same
period, the phrase "equal justice under law" appeared in only one case, but the
same search in the ALLNEWS database showed that 279 articles used those
words.
34. Some city ethics codes address the subject directly. For example, the
Dallas code states:
Sec. 3-122. Standards of Conduct.
(a) An officer or employee of the city shall not:
(2) Use his official position to secure special privileges or
exemptions for himself or others.
(3) Grant any special consideration, treatment or advantage
to a person or organization beyond that which is available to
every other person or organization....
DALLAs, TEX., CITY CODE art. XII § 3-122 (1998). The San Antonio Ethics Code
states in relevant part:
Sec. 2-44. Unfair Advancement of Private Interests
(a) General Rule. A city official or employee may not use his or
her official position to unfairly advance or impede private inter-
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law can, should, and will be used to assure a level playing field in
public life by eliminating, insofar as possible, any unfair advan-
tage that might be gained through the use of special connections
to those who exercise the power of government. '3 5 So too, in the
law school environment, students care deeply about whether they
are treated the same as other students, regardless of whether
there is more than one reasonable response to a given set of
facts. 6
On an individual level, disparate treatment of clients whose
affairs raise similar ethical questions causes clients to feel person-
ally aggrieved, unjustly treated. Disciplinary complaints and mal-
practice suits are only two of the more obvious potential
consequences of such feelings.3 7 On a systemic level, disparities
in the handling of ethical issues can produce diminished respect
for the legal profession. Of course, all of these consequences
have a corrosive effect on public confidence in the justice system.
For that reason alone, unnecessary disparity should be avoided.3"
The problems posed by disparate ethical decisions are par-
ticularly keen if legal services are rendered by a large number of
lawyers, if lawyers are drawn from divergent moral traditions, and
if information about disparate treatment is susceptible to wide
and rapid dissemination. All of these circumstances prevail in
contemporary America.
ests, or to grant or secure, or attempt to grant or secure, for any
person (including himself or herself) any form of special consid-
eration, treatment, exemption, or advantage beyond that which
is lawfully available to other persons.
SAN ANTONio, TEX., CODE art. III § 2-44 (1999).
35. Johnson, supra note 4, at 724.
36. In this respect, law students are no different from Americans gener-
ally. Americans, perhaps unwisely, like standardization and predictability.
Codified professional norms tend to produce just those results. See id. at 749-50
(discussing how the development of a consumerism mentality in America has
catalyzed calls for ethics in government).
37. See Anne E. Thar, Update Your Practice to Avoid Malpractice, Claims, 83
ILL. B.J. 427, 428 (1995) ("The only element common to all malpractice claims
is an unhappy client. More often than not, the client is not dissatisfied with the
legal work but with the treatment he or she received from the attorney."); see
also id. at 427 ("The ABA's groundbreaking study in the early 1980s on the
causes of legal malpractice revealed that fewer than half of all claims nation-
wide result from a 'substantive' error."); Anne E. Thar, 12 Steps to Prepare Your
Practice for the New Millenium, 86 ILL. B.J. 695, 695 (1998) (discussing ethical and
malpractice risk management, Thar writes, "[C]lient surveys consistently show
that our clients rate a lawyer's legal prowess and intelligence at the bottom of
the priority list.").
38. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995) (recog-
nizing that the "bar has a substantial interest in . . . preventing the erosion of
confidence in the legal profession").
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The American legal profession is currently surging toward a
million members in size.39 This figure reflects vast recent
increases in both the number and diversity of lawyers. As late as
1960, there were only 285,000 lawyers in the United States,4 ° the
overwhelming majority of whom were white and male.4 To a
large extent, lawyers of that era shared common values, whether
because of similar educational or ethnic backgrounds,4 2 com-
mon social activities, 4" or the relative lack of professional
mobility.44
During the past thirty years, due in large part to the achieve-
ments of the movements for civil rights, equal rights, and individ-
ual rights, the composition and nature of the profession have
changed dramatically. Today, the profession is more diverse in
terms of race, ethnicity, and gender than ever before.4 5 At the
39. See U.S. BUREU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTIcAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 417 tbl.672 (1998) (stating that in 1997 there were 925,000 lawyers and
judges who were employed).
40. See Julie Taylor, Demographics of the American Legal Profession (1983), in
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION:
RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 53 (2d ed. 1988) (noting the dramatic increase
in the number of lawyers during the first four score of the twentieth century
and stating the size of the American profession as follows: 1900, 115,000; 1945,
198,000; 1960, 285,000; 1970, 355,000; 1975, 456,000; 1982, 585,000). "The
number of lawyers doubled in the twenty years from 1960-1980-an increase of
100%." Id. at 53.
41. Cf MARc GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE Bic LAW FIRM 25 (1991) (discussing traditional big-
firm preference for "lawyers who are Nordic").
42. See id. at 25 (discussing the hiring preference of large firms, circa
1960, for white, Christian males who graduated from the "right" schools).
43. Cf id. (discussing the traditional preference of large law firms for law-
yers with the "'right' social background").
44. See id. at 23-24 (discussing the "golden age" of the big law firm, circa
1960, the authors write, "Partners might leave and firms might split up, but it
didn't happen very often.").
45. See Vincent R. Johnson & Virginia Coyle, On the Transformation of the
Legal Profession: The Advent of Temporary Lawyering, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 359,
360-61 (1990) (citing authorities for the proposition that "women and minori-
ties comprise increasingly larger percentages of law school graduates, practi-
tioners and the academic bar"); Mark Hansen, And Still Miles to Go, NAT'L BAR
ASS'N MAG., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 40 (according to the 1998 report of the ABA
Commission on Opportunities for Minorities in the Profession, "minorities
made up some 7.5 percent of the nation's lawyers in 1990, an increase from
about 5 percent in 1980" and "minority representation among law students
increased to nearly 20 percent by 1996"); Ritchenya A. Shepard, Top In-House
Women Gain Ground, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 6, 1999, at B4 ("The number of women
general counsel leading Fortune 500 legal departments has doubled in the past
three years."). Compare Michael D. Goldhaber, Black Lawyers: Lonely at the Bot-
tom, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 12, 1999, at A16 (citing a poll in which "three-fourths of
black lawyers agree with the statement that law firms offer 'tokenism,' and only
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same time, many of the social institutions which previously
exerted powerful influences over common life-such as religious
institutions," political parties,47  and labor unions8-have
declined in force. There is also greater mobility49 and faster dis-
semination of information5 ° than at any time in American
history.
It is difficult to identify today any source of moral beliefs
shared throughout the legal profession. Religion? Ancestry?
Patriotism? Professionalism? Each of these influences undoubt-
edly plays an important role in the lives and actions of many law-
yers. But, far from being sources of pervasively shared values,
their mere mention in one quarter is controversial in another.
Putting the point sharply, Tom Shaffer has written: "Americans
do not have a common idea of what a good person is. Our com-
mon ethic is not an ethic at all; it is the insertion of a referee in a
game in which the only rule is that every person is his own
tyrant." 1
8% see a genuine quest for diversity"), with Geoffrey G. Hazard, Jr., How Come
We're Happy?, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 26, 1999, at A18 (reporting a high level of job
satisfaction among lawyers generally and noting that "there were no major dif-
ferences in reported job satisfaction among women and minority lawyers").
46. See Richard John Neuhaus, The New Face of American Churches, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 9, 1988, at 24, (noting "steep decline of ... [mainstream] churches in
numbers and influence").
47. See Gerald F. Seib, Election Overload: Voters in California Offer Rest of
Nation Some Political Lessons, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 1994, at Al (discussing declin-
ing influence of political parties).
48. See Politicizing Pensions, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 1989, Al (noting declin-
ing influence of labor unions).
49. The growth in lawyer mobility has been particularly striking. "Law-
yers in the past spent their entire careers with the same firm." Austin Sarat,
Enactments of Professionalism: A Study ofJudges' and Lawyers' Accounts of Ethics and
Civility in Litigation, 67 FoRmiAM L. R-v. 809, 818 (1998). However, by the end
of the twentieth century, the same practice had become quite uncommon.
"Each year thousands of law firm associates leave the firms for which they have
worked, and then continue to practice law, either on their own or with other
attorneys." Johnson, supra note 27, at 4. "Partners in law firms have become
increasingly 'mobile,' feeling much freer than they formerly did and having
much greater opportunity than they formerly did, to shift from one firm to
another and take revenue-producing clients with them." William H. Rehnquist,
The Legal Profession Today, 62 IND. L.J. 151, 152 (1986).
50. See The Most Influential Innovations of the Millennium, WALL ST. J., Jan.
11, 1999, at A14 ("The fourth information revolution is now sweeping the
world.").
51. Shaffer, supra note 14, at 398. Continuing the argument, Shaffer says:
Most of the discussion I hear concerning legal ethics.. . is that a good
person is one who is free to choose whatever he or she wants. If there
are moral restraints on the choices people make, and the restraints are
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Absent a common shared moral tradition,52 it is unrealistic
to think that a million lawyers, independently resolving the ethi-
cal questions that arise in the practice of law, would arrive at the
same answers. If clients are to be afforded reasonably equal
treatment by the lawyers who serve them, the existence of ethics
codes is indispensable. Resolving ethical questions by reference
to a code may offer little opportunity for moral growth on the
part of lawyers, but it holds fair promise for ensuring equality of
client treatment.
C. Promotion of Ethical Discourse
If ethics codes in the legal profession tempt lawyers to let
others do their ethical reasoning for them, they offer that
inducement in a context which often involves at least some mem-
bers of the profession in a high level of ethical debate. The
deliberations attending the promulgation and implementation
of the provisions in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
dealing with the confidentiality of information relating to client
perjury or otherwise fraudulent conduct are excellent examples.
Those issues were exhaustively examined in a multitude of fora,
and the debates involved and attracted the attention of a wide
segment of the profession.5" So thoroughly were the issues of
perjury and client fraud considered that it is difficult to imagine
that any important perspective was unrepresented.54 Often, the
deliberations focused not on legal technicalities, but on substan-
beneficial, they seem to be systemic restraints that are necessary to
processes that protect each person's freedom of choice ....
Id.; see also id. at 396 n.16 (quoting Tom Buford, a teacher of religious ethics at
Furman University, as stating, "[A]n important characteristic of the twentieth
century is that there is no generally agreed upon ultimate principle, body of
knowledge, or power ... to which all of us ought appeal in settling disputes
among competing goods to determine which is correct.").
52. Cf Sarat, supra note 49, at 827 ("When they were asked to discuss
their own standards and aspirations as professionals and whether their stan-
dards were widely shared in the firms where they worked, most associates were
unable to identify with confidence the shared norms or aspirations of the
firms.").
53. See, e.g., Kenneth Krach, The Client-Fraud Dilemma: A Need for Consen-
sus, 46 MD. L. Rv. 436 (1986) (concluding that the ABA should re-evaluate its
position on attorney-client confidentiality); Norman Lefstein, Client Perjury in
Criminal Cases: Still in Search of an Answer, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 521 (1988)
(discussing the position of the Model Rules on perjury).
54. "[T]he problem of the perjurious defendant is one that has attracted
the attention of a small army of ... commentators." Maddox v. State, 613
S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981).
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tial moral principles.55 The legal profession benefitted from that
laborious process. And, arguably, the deliberations on these
issues were more robust, well-informed, and extensive than
would ever have been the case in the absence of a codification
project.
Of course, not all codification efforts have the moral weight
of the debates over perjury and fraud. The recent fussing over
how to write provisions relating to the Internet into the ethics
rules on lawyer advertising is an excellent example of the other
end of the spectrum.56 However, the mere fact that some code
provisions do not deal with genuine "ethical" issues does not
mean that the rules that do trivialize the ethical decisionmaking
process. Rules in the latter category invite attention to, and care-
ful consideration of, matters which might otherwise go
unaddressed.
Of course, some members of the profession, knowing that a
codification effort is underway, may sit idly on the sideline await-
ing word from "on high." In that sense, the drafting or
reforming of a code may discourage individual consideration or
discussion of the issues in question. The bystander may reason
that since someone is taking care of the matter, there is no need
to get involved. It is impossible to say whether this risk of dis-
couraging ethical discourse outweighs the tendency of codifica-
tion efforts to promote ethical discussion because of their
visibility and apparent importance.
Undoubtedly, codification of professional norms changes
the nature of ethical discussion. First, in a codified world, the
process of ethical deliberation-which in many respects relates
to the adoption and teaching of such codes-tends to be a public
process, rather than a private one. Second, to the extent that
ethical questions are "resolved" by mandatory codified standards,
there are fewer matters left open for individual resolution.
These realities may entail significant consequences. One group
55. See, e.g., THOMAS L. SHAFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER 97-
99 (1981) (discussing a proposed version of the Model Rules); Marvin E. Fran-
kel, Clients' Perjury and Lawyers' Options, I J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 25
(1996).
56. See Amendment F: The Internet and Other Electronic Media, 61 TEX. B.J.
837 (1998) (detailing proposed changes in the advertising rules to include com-
munications through media such as websites and electronic mail). Cf David
Beckman & David Hirsch, Rules of The Road: Legal Ethics May Be Speed Bumps on
the Internet Superhighway, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1996, at 86; Regina Galindo Carter &
Freddie Baird, Spectrum: Web Ethics, 60 TEX. B.J. 196, 196 (1997) (asserting that
"[ltraditional lawyer advertising rules and regulations are quickly being
adapted to evolving forms of electronic communication").
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adversely affected is those who, like Shaffer, 7 seek to draw from
religion ethical inspiration for the practice of law. In many pub-
lic fora, religiously-based arguments are today viewed as not
acceptable, 8 or at least they seem to be rare.5 9 In addition, the
fewer ethical matters left by codes for individual deliberation, the
fewer opportunities there are for lawyers to rely on religious prin-
ciples in personally resolving questions of professional ethics.
Either way, religion loses. But the solution to that problem is not
to eschew codification. Rather, it is to change the process of
public deliberation to accommodate those values (religious or
otherwise) that are thought to provide guidance.
D. The Declarative Function of Ethics Codes
Codification of ethics rules can perform a valuable declara-
tive function, particularly when the rules consist not merely of
prohibitions, but of statements of affirmative obligation and
aspirational principles. As my colleague Geary Reamey has
argued, "When we memorialize our aspirations in... [an ethics]
code.., we publicly proclaim, not what we are, but what we want
to be, what we insist on being."6 Similarly, when we articulate
ethical obligations, we identify certain kinds of behavior as not
merely desirable, but so important as to command unswerving
compliance. Entirely aside from any issues of compliance or
57. See Shaffer, supra note 14, at 393-96:
Legal ethics has become a new and impressive mansion-a mansion
with many rooms ....
The room I use is in the attic. It is small and easy to ignore ....
It is the room devoted to religious legal ethics ....
... I tend, along with a few others, to contemplate moral proposi-
tions and quandries involving lawyers from that little room .... I
suggest that the best way to be a lawyer and righteous at the same time
is to practice law as a ministry-a religious ministry ....
My purpose here is to claim legitimacy for religious legal
ethics....
58. See Steven D. Smith, Augustinian Liberal, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1673,
1673 (1999) (discussing the theory that religious belief is inadmissible in public
discourse).
59. But see Laurie Goodstein, White House Seekers Wear Faith on Sleeve and
Stump, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1999, at Al (reporting that candidates for the presi-
dency are "engaging in 'God talk' that is more explicit, more intimate and
more pervasive than at any time in recent decades").
60. Gerald S. Reamey, Ethics Code Not Hollow Words, SAN ANTONio ExPREss-
NEws, Feb. 4, 1998, at 5B.
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enforcement, such codified statements serve valuable educa-
tional6 and inspirational functions.
The process of protecting civil rights often begins with a
statement, such as a constitution, affirming the very existence
and importance of those rights.62 So too, ethical conduct can,
and often does, begin with a statement in an ethics code identify-
ing what types of conduct are prohibited, desirable, or required.
There is no reason to conclude that promulgation of an ethics
code marks the end of efforts to live ethically, any more than the
drafting of a constitution necessarily terminates the efforts of a
society to act civilly.
A profession unwilling to state its principles in clear written
form is probably not a profession at all.63 Scholars have long
noted that one of the things that sets a profession apart from
other callings, is the existence of a body of professional norms to
guide the provision of specialized services. A profession, by defi-
nition, must declare the principles for which it stands.
E. Reconsideration of Ethical Choices
Another advantage of codified professional ethics rules is
that a code, by its very nature, invites re-examination of the
choices of principle embodied in the code.6 4 The terms of
61. See WoLFRAM, supra note 6, at 54:
A code of rules that is clear and fair can serve an important educa-
tional role by instructing receptive readers on what is considered right
and wrong. Even initially resistant members of the profession may
alter their behavior, not only from fear of enforcement, but from a
broader realization of the implications of their actions.
62. Cf Vincent RobertJohnson, The French Declaration of the Rights of Man
and Citizens of 1789, the Reign of Terror, and the Revoluntionary Tribunal of Paris, 13
B.C. IN T'L & Comp. L. REv. 1, 32 (1990):
To focus on the [Reign of] Terror to the neglect of the Declaration of
Rights itself would be to obscure the importance of publicly articulat-
ing basic civil rights. The Declaration of Rights had dared to proclaim
in ringing terms what few documents had ever before stated. In so
doing, the Declaration of Rights bore witness to what much of the
world now recognizes as self-evident, inalienable, basic civil rights.
The Declaration of Rights raised the sights of countless thousands, in
France and elsewhere, toward the prospect of a better, more decent
way of life. While it may be true that today "bills of ights are a dime a
dozen," that was not true in 1789. As the French revolutionaries well
recognized, any sincere effort to protect civil ights must begin with
their articulation-that quintessentially human act of daring to say
that they exist and are important.
63. See WOLFRAM, supra note 6, at 48 ("Today a code of ethics is required
regalia for an occupational group that aspires to professional status.").
64. See, e.g., Symposium, A Decade After the Model Rules, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 799 (1993).
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existing rules focus the discussion and provide targets for delib-
eration.6" Criticism of those rules then informs future choices
on whether prior decisions about principles should be reaf-
firmed or changed.
To be sure, many professionals, such as lawyers subject to
ethics codes, may be interested in nothing more than the most
painless path to compliance. However, others inevitably are
moved to question a stated norm. The process of re-examina-
tion, particularly when conducted in public and subject to the
watchful eye of disinterested parties, is natural and healthy.
The same opportunities are frequently not present when
ethical decision-making is predominantly individualized. Of
course, the individual decision-maker normally is in an excellent
position to reconsider his or her past choices. But others, espe-
cially those who are in a position to be more objective, typically
lack the familiarity with the facts that would enable them to offer
insight. It is the rare case where a personal ethical decision
attracts widespread attention and comment, and absent such
scrutiny the process of ethical re-evaluation is likely to be less well
informed or robust.
V. THE LIMITS OF CODIFIED RULES
Notwithstanding the preceding arguments, there are limits
to what can be achieved by a code of professional ethics due to
the nature of language, the wide range of professional conduct,
the difficulty of integrating moral principles into disciplinary
standards, and the process of compromise that attends the enact-
ment of a code.
A. The Nature of Language
It is exceedingly difficult to write an ethics code with the just
the right level of detail. Simple rules are often insufficient to
deal with complex situations. And complex rules cannot be ade-
quately communicated, remembered, or enforced.
An example of the former is Model Rule 8.04(c). With cer-
tainty and simplicity, the rule declares that a lawyer shall not
"engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrep-
resentation. " " But it takes only a moment to ask whether therule covers all forms of misrepresentation-not just deliberate
65. See, e.g., Robert A. Stein, Updating Our Ethics Rules, A.B.A. J., Aug.
1998, at 104 (discussing "a comprehensive review and evaluation of the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct in light of developments in the legal pro-
fession and society since the model rules were adopted in 1983").
66. MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 8.4(c) (1983).
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misstatements, but also negligent and innocent ones as well.
With that simple question, much of the clarity of the rule
dissolves.67
In contrast, the Model Rules' conflict-of-interest provisions68
are anything but simple. Intricately drafted, finely nuanced, and
exhaustive (or at least exhausting), the conflict-of-interest rules
often generate uncertainty in the minds of those seeking to fol-
low or apply them. They lend themselves to neither education
nor enforcement.
At a minimum, an ethics rule should be understandable,
memorable, predictable, and capable of efficient enforcement.
Unfortunately, the nature of language and the uncertainties of
life make those simple objectives frequently unobtainable.
B. The Range of Professional Conduct
Lawyers engage in a wide range of professional conduct, the
nature and complexity of which it is difficult to anticipate. Natu-
rally, the ethical issues that lawyers encounter cover an equally
broad spectrum, and many times those issues are difficult to fore-
see. However, an ethics code that fails to anticipate and address
potential problems fully may do more to engender public and
professional cynicism than to elevate the tone of practice or to
inspire confidence among the citizenry.
As far as a regulatory document isconcerned, no criticism so
discredits its content as the charge that the document contains
"loopholes." Such allegations, even if unwarranted, call into
question not merely the substance of the enactment, but the
competence of the drafters and the value of the project at all.
Unfortunately, even the most careful drafting cannot antici-
pate all problems. A good example can be drawn from the field
of government service. In San Antonio, Texas, the nation's
eighth largest city, I led a blue-ribbon panel of academics, civic
activists, and public servants in the task of reforming the city's
ethics code. As part of a process which spanned more than eight-
een months and forty meetings, under the scrutiny of widespread
67. The language of Rule 8.4(c) is identical to that contained in the ear-
lier MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A) (4) (1980) and
that found in the ethics codes of many states. Decisions interpreting this lan-
guage have routinely required proof of intentional deception; a finding of
innocent misrepresentation, or even negligent conduct, will not support the
conclusion that the rule has been violated. See, e.g., State Bar of Tex. v. Lerner,
859 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
68. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7-1.12 (1983).
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media attention,69 the task force studied model enactments,
related state and federal statutes, and legal commentary. Every
provision contained in the ethics codes of eight other major cit-
ies7° was specifically considered by the group, and based upon
the task force's recommendations, a new ethics code was enacted
in November 1998 to cover more than 11,000 city officials and
employees and persons doing business with the city. In particu-
lar, the code contained rules governing lobbyists far more exten-
sive than any I am aware of in any American city. One might
have thought that the new code, which quadrupled the length of
the city's prior ethics law, was comprehensive. But when the first
case arose under the new law, the case presented an issue which
none of the drafters had anticipated: the permissibility of a part-
time state legislator acting as a lobbyist before the city and using
the prestige of his state office for the benefit of private inter-
ests."1 While many contended that the conduct was wrong, there
was nothing in the code that specifically addressed the issue.
Presumably, all ethics codes face a similar problem. The
varieties of human conduct are so diverse and difficult to forecast
that no ethics code can fully anticipate all of the serious issues
that are likely to arise. To put it a bit more colorfully, as Geary
Reamey has said, "even highly skilled wordsmiths and astute stu-
dents of political anthropology fail to anticipate every possible
way in which creatively unscrupulous ,eople can slide around
and through the most tightly knit law.,2
C. The Difficulty of Integrating Moral Principles with
Mandatory Standards
Moral principles speak in terms of what an individual
"ought" to do. They challenge a person to do the "right" thing,
but in the end the decision on what will be done is left to the
individual. In contrast to moral principles, laws focus on what
,'must" be done. There is no room for the exercise of discretion;
all persons within the terms of the law must comply.
69. SeeJohnson, supra note 4, at 719 n.8 (listing numerous examples of
newspaper coverage).
70. Austin, Dallas, Houston, Indianapolis, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Phoe-
nix, and San Jose.
71. See Christopher Anderson, Mayor Calls for Cubs on Lobbyists, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 14, 1999, at 1B (discussing concern about "the
influence and propriety of state legislators who lobby for pay at the local
level."); Christopher Anderson, Records Show Pair Didn't File as Lobbyists, SAN
ANTONio ExPREss-NEws, Mar. 4,1999, at IB (discussing lobbying efforts by "one
of the most influential members of the Legislature").
72. Reamey, supra note 60, at 5B.
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Owing to the considerable difference between "ought" and
"must," it is difficult to integrate moral principles into an ethics
code comprised mainly of rules that are intended to be enforced
as a form of law. Yet without "background" moral principles that
can be used to fill the gaps that arise from inevitably imperfect
rules or as aids to interpretation, mandatory ethics code provi-
sions quickly degenerate into mere legalisms.
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility, promul-
gated in 1969," 3 used a format that embraced both aspirational
principles and mandatory standards. In each of the nine chap-
ters of the Code (which were called Canons), there was a set of
aspirational principles, called Ethical Considerations (ECs), and
a set of mandatory standards, called Disciplinary Rules (DRs).
The ECs had the flavor of moral principles; they attempted to
identify the goals toward which a good lawyer should strive. The
DRs were enforceable legal standards; they stated what every law-
yer must do under pain of professional discipline. The EC/DR
format was really quite useful. The DRs identified what types of
conduct were minimally acceptable, and the ECs encouraged
lawyers to strive for a much higher level of performance. It was
clear from the format of the Model Code that moral principles
had relevance to the practice of law.
The Code was widely adopted in the early 1970s, 7 but soon
attracted criticism on a number of grounds. It was urged that the
substantive rules of the Code were out of date (for example, with
respect to constitutional developments in the field of free
speech), that they failed to address important facets of law prac-
tice (for example, the ethical obligations of attorneys represent-
ing entities, the government, or pro bono clients), and that they
were less than clear in dealing with some key matters (for exam-
ple, conflicts of interest),75 Unfortunately, the format of the
Code was also criticized as too confusing, 76 although it is difficult
to see the basis for that claim.
73. SeeJohnson, supra note 27, at 17-18 (discussing the ABA's adoption of
the Model Code in 1969 and its later replacement by the Model Rules).
74. During the years immediately following its adoption by the American
Bar Association, the Model Code was enacted, officially or unofficially, in every
jurisdiction, generally with few modifications. See WoLFRAM, supra note 6, at 56-
57.
75. See WOLFRAM, supra note 6, at 61 (discussing critiques of the 1969
Model Code).
76. See Smith, supra note 5, at 155 ("the Model Code has been criticized
for straddling 'the uncomfortable fence between a creed-like system and a
code-like system' and for displaying an awkward ambivalence on the issue of
whether to wholly depart from aspiration and turn instead to minimum
enforceable standards").
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When the Code was replaced in 1983 as pattern legislation
by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, EC/DR format was
abandoned.77 The Model Rules are drafted in the style of the
American Law Institute Restatements. Each topic is addressed by
a blackletter rule, which typically speaks in mandatory terms, and
each blackletter rule is followed by a substantive comment clarify-
ing the reach of the rule. The Model Rules contain very little
aspirational content and few, if any, statements of moral princi-
ple.7" The format of the Model Rules suggests that lawyers
should be concerned with legality, not morality. Of course, that
disconnection of "must" and "ought" makes it easier for lawyers
to ignore the moral consequences of their actions. Denial of
responsibility for what a client is doing is facilitated, and that in
turn increases the risk of incivility.79
It may be coincidence, but the adoption of the Model Rules
at the state level roughly coincided with the advent of what is
sometimes called "Rambo" litigation, 0 the use of ethics rules as
weapons for private advantage in aggressive litigation. Uncon-
strained by statements of moral principle, the provisions of the
Model Rules were (and continue to be) invoked for purposes of
77. See John Gibeaut, Doing the Right Thing: Lawyers May Have to Look
Beyond Conduct Rules for Ethics Answers, A.B.A. J., July 1997, at 98:
In 1983, the ABA adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in
an effort to provide clearer ethics guideposts to replace the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility .... Gone from the Model Rules
were the ethical considerations that figured prominently behind the
code's disciplinary rules. Most states today have adopted significant
portions of the Model Rules.
78. "The Model Rules begin with a Preamble that... alludes to the neces-
sity that a lawyer consider moral and other considerations in making discretion-
ary professional decisions." WoLRAM, supra note 6, at 63.
79. See Sarat, supra note 49, at 827:
In the accounts of most of the lawyers and judges with whom we spoke
two things stand out: first, ethical problems are not high on their list
of concerns; second, when breaches occur, responsibility for incivility
and for professional deviance is placed elsewhere-by large-firm law-
yers on plaintiffs' lawyers, in-house counsel, and judges; by plaintiffs'
lawyers on defendants and their lawyers who allegedly routinely hide
documents and abuse discovery and on a "defense oriented" judiciary;
by in-house counsel on plaintiffs' lawyers who file frivolous cases and
use discovery as fishing expeditions, on large firms that are reluctant
to take risks and that are too interested in protecting their own privi-
leges; and by judges on lawyers who do not take their professional
obligations seriously enough and on appellate courts that routinely
undo whatever trial judges try to do to manage the discovery process.
80. See Thomas M. Reavley, Rambo Litigators: Pitting Aggressive Tactics
Against Legal Ethics, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 637 (1990) (discussing the preference for
melodramatic performances by trial lawyers and the growing intolerance of
such techniques); Smith, supra note 5, at 158.
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partisan advantage."1 One response has been the adoption in
many jurisdictions of civility codes.8 2 These codes of professional
courtesy typically attempt to resurrect aspirational principles of
the type of that were once found in the Model Code. Although
well intended in their inception, it is doubtful that the new civil-
ity codes have much impact on the actual practice of law.83
These hoary statements of good practice probably do not receive
much attention in law school classes, and lawyers faced with an
ethical dilemma probably do not turn to the civility code rather
than to the disciplinary rules. The lesson would seem to be that
it is difficult to integrate moral principles into disciplinary stan-
dards, and that once such content is removed it cannot easily be
put back.
D. Compromises Attending Enactment
The effectiveness of an ethics codes can be seriously limited
by compromises made in the adoption process. Not all persons
who participate in such efforts are actuated by the common
good. "[P]rofessional codes ... [may] be the products of grasp-
ing and selfish motivations, based on anticompetitive or class-
based animus." 4 In the case of lawyer codes, the drafting pro-
cess frequently involves "turf wars" between members of the
defense bar and the plaintiffs' bar, between attorneys in large
firms and those in smaller practices, and between newcomers
81. Cf Gibeaut, supra note 77.
[A]re the Model Rules doing the job? They may be more clear-cut
than their predecessors, but that also may be their undoing. Indeed,
the rules themselves may need another look because they have caused
many lawyers to drift from ethical deliberations over their professional
conduct to "technocratic lawyering" in efforts to get around specific
rules, said Heidi Li Feldman, a professor at the University of Michigan
Law School in Ann Arbor.
"It's like bait," Feldman said. "You dangle a code in front of law-
yers, and they immediately start fishing for loopholes."
Id. at 98; Vincent R. Johnson, Ethical Campaigning for the Judiciary, 29 TEX. TECH
L. REv. 811, 812-13 (1998) (referring to "the 'scorched earth' tactics that
became commonplace in the late 1980s and early 1990s in certain fields of civil
litigation" and related developments involving abusive criticism ofjudges in the
1990s).
82. See Smith, supra note 5, at 156-60 (discussing the movement toward
civility codes); see also Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalism as Class Ideology: Civility
Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 657 (1994).
83. See Smith, supra note 5, at 153 (1998) (noting that civility codes "that
are not merely redundant [of disciplinary rules] have been drafted and imple-
mented ineffectively").
84. WOLFRAM, supra note 6, at 48.
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and established practitioners, to mention only a few of the fault
lines.
In addition, codification is often an exercise in lowering
expectations. As Professor Charles Wolfman has remarked:
Drafting is inherently a process of finding the lowest com-
mon denominator. A realist drafting a lawyer code must
be reluctant to draft strong or radical provisions for fear
that a powerful segment of lawyers will find them too odi-
ous or unprofitable.... [T] he area left for regulation is a
relatively narrow range that falls between marginal
enforceable rules and insubstantial rules. 85
The rules that emerge from a partisan drafting process may
be seriously infirm.86 Because the provisions in modern ethics
codes are typically mandatory, a defective rule, rather than help-
ing an attorney to do the right thing, may make doing so more
difficult or impossible. In such circumstances, the lawyer (and
probably the client) would be better off without any ethics rule at
all.
CONCLUSION
Tom Shaffer may be right. Ethics codes may indeed tempt
lawyers to let others do their ethical thinking for them and to
eschew responsibility for the actions they take.8 7 But even if that
is true, it would be neither wise nor feasible for the profession to
dispense with such formulations. Lawyers' ethics codes provide
an important basis for the equitable delivery of legal services and
a valuable tool for stating professional aspirations, re-examining
ethical choices, and promoting open discussion of ethical issues.
In the absence of such codified standards, the ethical quality of
law practice would quickly degenerate into inconsistency and
unpredictability, with each of a million lawyers ruling a different
fiefdom. Chaos on ethical matters would be the order of the day.
85. Id. at 49.
86. Cf. Gibeaut, supra note 77, at 98 (noting Professor Monroe Freed-
man's criticism of the Restatement, Third, of the Law Governing Lawyers: "It is
tainted, I believe, by the self-interest of lawyers involved in the project.").
87. In addition, grappling with codes seems to deaden common sense.
Each year, about halfway into my course on Professional Responsibility I ask my
students, "Is it permissible for a lawyer to lie [for some reason or another]?"
The response is always thoughtful silence, which would not have been the case
on the first day of the class. The only suitable response, I find, is to indignantly
bang on the table and shout, "Of course not!" That seems to have the effect of
momentarily awakening the students from their code-fixation-induced stupor.
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Shaffer goes a bit too far when he says that ethics rules have
"very little to do with being righteous.""8 At least with respect to
relations between attorney and client, 9 the lawyer codes now in
force in the United States set a high standard for performance.
A lawyer who complies with those provisions undoubtedly takes
important steps in the direction of treating clients fairly in the
best sense of the term. To the extent that Shaffer is arguing
(albeit with a bit of color) that a code is only a starting point in
ethical decision-making, there can be no debate. Codes are
floors, not ceilings. Codified rules cannot ensure that law is prac-
ticed humanely.9 ° But they can dispose of unnecessary impedi-
ments to that type of practice, as well as call lawyers to that
greater goal.
As Professor Jeffrey D. Sachs recently remarked in another
context, "It is in the legal realm that we find many of the deepest
weakness and greatest hopes for our age."'" Thus it is not sur-
prising that the ethics codes, which during the twentieth century
became ubiquitous features of the legal profession and other
callings, hold great potential for achieving important goals, and
yet suffer significant limitations. The challenge, of course, is to
use codified rules of ethics in a way that maximizes the former
and minimizes the latter.
88. Shaffer, supra note 14, at 396.
89. Under standard rules of legal ethics, clients are entitled to first-class
treatment. Non-clients, in contrast, are afforded only limited protection. See
Vincent R. Johnson, Ethics in Licensing, 496 PLI/PAT 463 (1997) (a "layperson
[who is not a client] is entitled to common decency (e.g., the lawyer may not
intentionally mislead the layperson), but otherwise is afforded little, if anything,
in the way of special protection"). Not surprisingly, it is possible to argue that
compliance with the usual rules leads to improper treatment of third-persons
not enjoying client status. See Sarat, supra note 49, at 818 (quoting David Luban
as stating, "The adversary system thus excuses lawyers from common moral obli-
gations to nonclients."); W. William Hodes, Lauyers Should Owe a.Duty to Non-
Clients, NAT'L LJ., Jan. 30, 1995, at A20.
90. Cf Gibeaut, supra note 77, at 98:
Black-letter rules of professional conduct may not be enough by them-
selves to assure public confidence in the justice system.
So the profession needs to give renewed weight to a concept even
more fundamental, if often elusive: ethical decision-making based on
moral principles. In other words, lawyers must do the right thing.
91. Jeffrey D. Sachs, Globalization and the Rule of Law, YALE LAw SCHOOL
OCCASIONAL PAPERS, SECOND SERIES, No. 4, at 5 (1998).
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